Report on e-Voting Security Not Made Public
It's one thing to keep quite about a vulnerability which, if made public, could harm those running systems with the vulnerability. That reasoning doesn't fly with e-voting machines.
Techdirt has been following the story of possible problems with e-voting machines in New Jersey. The state hired security experts to conduct a study, that study is not going to be released, per order of a judge. The report should have been released by now according to Andrew Appel, one of the expert witnesses in the case. He posted on his blog:
A judge of the New Jersey Superior Court has prohibited the scheduled release of a report on the security and accuracy of the Sequoia AVC Advantage voting machine. Last June, Judge Linda Feinberg ordered Sequoia Voting Systems to turn over its source code to me (serving as an expert witness, assisted by a team of computer scientists) for a thorough examination. At that time she also ordered that we could publish our report 30 days after delivering it to the Court--which should have been today [October 2, 2008].
It's not clear what harm would come from releasing this information, in fact one would think the election officials would want details in case they need to deploy alternate voting mechanisms.
Secrecy is necessary for to protect against some vulnerabilities (like the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability found earlier this year) but this sure doesn't look like one of those cases.



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